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SAADIA GAON ON THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 
Eleonore Stump 
Considerable effort has been expended on constructing theodicies which try 
to reconcile the suffering of unwilling innocents, such as Job, with the exis-
tence and nature of Cod as understood in Christian theology. There is, of 
course, abundant reflection on the problem of evil and the story of Job in 
the history of Jewish thought, but this material has not been discussed 
much in contemporary philosophical literature. I want to take a step 
towards remedying this defect by examining the interpretation of the story 
of Job and the solution to the problem of evil given by one important and 
influential Jewish thinker, Saadia Caon. 
The problem of evil is raised by the combination of traditional theistic 
beliefs and the acknowledgement that there is evil in the world. If there is 
a perfectly good, omnipotent, omniscient God who creates and governs the 
world, how can the world he created and governs have suffering in it? 
This question, of course, needs to be made more precise. It is widely 
accepted that human beings have free will and are able to misuse that free 
will in immoral ways. Some punishment of the wicked doesn't seem 
incompatible with God's existence. As far as that goes, some people freely 
choose to subject themselves to suffering. Odysseus chooses to join the 
expedition to Troy although he knows that doing so will result in all the 
sufferings of war. Such suffering, freely brought on himself by the suffer-
er, also doesn't seem incompatible with the existence of a God with the tra-
ditional attributes. So when the existence of evil in the world looks difficult 
to reconcile with the existence of God, the evil in question must be the suf-
fering of unwilling innocents, those whose suffering is neither chosen nor 
deserved by them. 
Job is the classic case in literature of an unwilling innocent whose suffer-
ing is, on the face of it, incompatible with the existence of God. It is an 
explicit and much emphasized part of the story that Job is entirely inno-
cent, that his suffering in no way constitutes punishment for wrongdoing. 
It is equally obvious that his suffering isn't anything that he has chosen; it 
is simply inflicted on him, by marauding evildoers, by nature, and, in some 
sense, by God. For many contemporary thinkers, suffering such as that 
endured by Job is evidence against the existence of God. For committed 
theists, such as Job himself in the story, what is called in question by such 
suffering is not God's existence but one or more of the attributes tradition-
ally assigned to him. Job himself, with some passion, questions God's 
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goodness. How a commentator on the story of Job deals with the apparent 
incompatibility of Job's suffering with the existence or traditional attributes 
of God thus reveals his attitude towards the problem of evil. 
In philosophy of religion recently, considerable effort has been expend-
ed on constructing (or reconstructing) Christian theodicies, which try to 
find ways consonant with Christian belief to reconcile the suffering of 
unwilling innocents, such as Job, with the existence and nature of God as 
understood in Christian theology. Theodicies of this sort make use of such 
Christian doctrines as original sin, incarnation, and atonement.! But, of 
course, the story of Job is part of the Hebrew Bible, and there is abundant 
reflection on the story of Job in Jewish philosophical theology. This materi-
al, however, has not been discussed much in contemporary philosophical 
literature on the problem of evil. In this paper, I want to take a step 
towards remedying this defect by examining the interpretation of the story 
of Job and the solution to the problem of evil given by one important and 
influential Jewish thinker, Saadia Gaon.2 As I have argued elsewhere, the 
sort of approach to the problem of evil of which Saadia's theodicy is one 
example can be defended against many of the main objections it invites.3 
But in this paper, my aim will be largely to investigate and clarify what 
Saadia's theodicy is, not to defend it. 
Since Saadia is not as well known as some other medieval philosophers, it 
may also be helpful at the outset to say something very briefly about his life. 
Saadia ben Josef al-Fayyumi was born in Fayyum in Egypt in 892.4 Even 
in his youth, he was involved in intellectual and religious controversy. He 
was an active opponent of the Karaites, who rejected the importance of the 
Talmud and Midrash and argued for a solely literal interpretation of bibli-
cal texts. He was also an outspoken and effective participant in a contro-
versy between Palestinian and Babylonian rabbis over the religious calen-
dar. Saadia was on the side of the Babylonians and was thought to have 
refuted the Palestinian rabbis. In 921/2, in recognition of his success in this 
controversy, he was made a member of the famous and influential 
Academy of Sura. In 928 he was appointed Gaon or Head of the Academy, 
a position of considerable eminence in the medieval Jewish world. 
After a brief period in office, he quarreled with the Exiliarch, the politi-
cal leader of the Jewish community in Babylon, and the quarrel became so 
fierce that it led to Saadia's removal from the Gaonate. Saadia was in 
retirement for the next five years, a time which proved to be very produc-
tive for him; his main philosophical work was written in this period. 
Eventually, he was reconciled with the Exiliarch and restored to his posi-
tion as Gaon, but he did not remain Gaon long. He died in 942, only five 
years after resuming his position.s 
He was an influential thinker and a prolific author, writing on topics as 
diverse as chronology and psychology; but his magnum opus, which con-
tains a considerable discussion of the problem of evil, is The Book of Beliefs 
and Opinions.6 He also wrote a lengthy commentary on the book of Job.7 In 
what follows, I will be considering Saadia's views of the problem of evil as 
they are presented in these two works. 
In order to show the nature of Saadia's theodicy and his interpretation of 
the story of Job, I think it is helpful to have a medieval Christian analogue 
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for comparison. Because medieval Jews and Christians share many philo-
sophical and theological views, one way to elucidate a medieval Jewish 
theodicy such as Saadia's is to overlay Saadia's theodicy with that of a typi-
cal medieval Christian and to look for the differences between them. So I 
will first give a brief summary of Aquinas's reading of the story of Job, and 
then I will present Saadia's, as Saadia is commonly understood. I will then 
argue that this common understanding of Saadia's views is inaccurate and 
simplistic. If we look carefully at Saadia's theodicy in The Book of Beliefs and 
Opinions, which, according to contemporary scholars, contains generally the 
same view of the problem of evil as his commentary on Job does, we can see 
that his theodicy is subtler and more defensible than has been generally 
supposed. Finally, I will argue that, interpreted in the way I am arguing for, 
Saadia's theodicy is much closer to Aquinas's than at first appears. Seeing 
why their positions are as close as they are gives us some insight, I think, 
into the issues at stake in considerations of the problem of evil. 
Aquinas on Job 
Aquinas approaches the book of Job with the conviction that God's exis-
tence is not in doubt, either for the characters in the story of Job or for the 
readers of that story.8 On his view, those who go astray in contemplating 
sufferings such as Job's do so because, like Job's comforters, they mistaken-
ly suppose that happiness and unhappiness are functions just of things in 
this life. Aquinas, on the other hand, takes the book of Job to be trying to 
instill in us the conviction that there is another life after this one, that our 
ultimate happiness lies there rather than here, and that we attain to that 
happiness only through suffering.9 
On Aquinas's view, all human beings have a terminal cancer of soul, a 
proneness to evil which invariably eventuates in sin and which in the right 
circumstances blows up into monstrosity. On his view, even "our senses 
and our thoughts are prone to evil."!O The pure and innocent among 
human beings are no exception to this claim. When the biblical text says 
that Job was righteous, Aquinas takes the text to mean that Job was pure 
by human standards. By the objective, uncurved standards of God, even 
Job was infected with the radical human tendencies toward evil.]] No 
human being who remains uncured of this disease can see God. On 
Aquinas's view, then, the primary obstacle to union with God, in which 
true and ultimate human happiness consists, is the sinful character of 
human beings. 
Aquinas thinks that pain and suffering of all sorts are God's medicine 
for this spiritual cancer,12 and he emphasizes this view repeatedly.n 
Arguing that temporal goods such as those Job lost are given and taken 
away according to God's will, Aquinas says 
"someone's suffering adversity would not be pleasing to God except 
for the sake of some good coming from the adversity. And so 
although adversity is in itself bitter and gives rise to sadness, it 
should nonetheless be agreeable [to us] when we consider its useful-
ness, on account of which it is pleasing to God .... For in his reason a 
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person rejoices over the taking of bitter medicine because of the hope 
of health, even though in his senses he is troubled.//14 
For Aquinas, then, what justifies the suffering of an unwilling innocent is 
that the suffering acts as a spiritual chemotherapeutic agent, keeping the 
spiritual cancer of the soul from killing the patient. 
Aquinas thus sets fairly strenuous standards for theodicy. The morally 
sufficient reason for God's allowing unwilling innnocents to suffer consists 
in a benefit which comes, largely or primarily, to the sufferer and which 
consists in warding off a greater evil for the sufferer. So, for example, com-
menting on a line in Job containing the complaint that God sometimes 
doesn't hear a needy person's prayers, Aquinas says, 
"Now it sometimes happens that God hearkens not to a person's 
pleas but rather to his advantage. A doctor does not hearken to the 
pleas of the sick person who requests that the bitter medicine be 
taken away (supposing that the doctor doesn't take it away because 
he knows that it contributes to health); instead he hearkens to [the 
patient's] advantage, because by doing so he produces health, which 
the sick person wants most of all. In the same way, God does not 
remove tribulations from the person stuck in them, even though he 
prays earnestly for God to do so, because God knows these tribula-
tions help him forward to final salvation. And so although God truly 
does hearken, the person stuck in afflictions believes that God hasn't 
hearkened to him.// Is 
In fact, on Aquinas's view, the better the person, the more likely it is that 
he will experience suffering. In explicating two metaphors of Job's,16 com-
paring human beings in this life to soldiers on a military campaign and to 
servants, Aquinas makes the point in this way: 
"It is plain that the general of an army does not spare [his] more 
active soldiers dangers or exertions, but as the plan of battle requires, 
he sometimes lays them open to greater dangers and greater exer-
tions. But after the attainment of victory, he bestows greater honor 
on the more active soldiers. So also the head of a household assigns 
greater exertions to his better servants, but when it is time to reward 
them, he lavishes greater gifts on them. And so neither is it charac-
teristic of divine providence that it should exempt good people more 
from the adversities and exertions of the present life, but rather that it 
reward them more at the end."17 
Underlying these remarks of Aquinas's is the thought that, just as there 
are degrees of bodily health, so there are also various gradations of spiritu-
al health. Those persons who are morally or spiritually stronger are given 
more suffering so that they might be more thoroughly cured of their own 
evil and brought to a more robust state of spiritual wellbeing. Someone 
might suppose here that on Aquinas's views he ought to say not that better 
people suffer more but rather that worse people, who need more suffering, 
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suffer more. But an analogy with chemotherapy is helpful here. 
Sometimes the most effective kinds of chemotherapy can't be used on 
those who need it most because their systems are too weak to bear the 
treatments, and so the strongest kinds of treatment tend to be reserved for 
those who aren't too old or too advanced in the disease or too riddled with 
secondary complications - in other words, for those who are (apart from 
their cancer) strong and healthy. 
So, on Aquinas's view, Job has more suffering than ordinary people 
not because he is morally worse than ordinary, as the comforters assume, 
but just because he is better. Because he is a better soldier in the war 
against his own evil and a better servant of God's, God can give him more 
to bear here. Even the dreadful suffering Job experiences at the death of his 
good and virtuous children becomes transformed on this account from the 
unbearable awfulness of total loss to the bitter but temporary agony of sep-
aration, since in being united to God in love in heaven, a person is also 
united with others. The ultimate good of union with God, like any great 
good, is by nature shareable. 
Aquinas recognizes that his position will seem counter-intuitive or 
worse to some people, and he takes this difference in attitude to stem from 
a more general difference in philosophical and theological worldview. "If 
there were no resurrection of the dead," he says, "people wouldn't think it 
was a power and a glory to abandon all that can give pleasure and to bear 
the pains of death and dishonor; instead they would think it was stupid."18 
His theodicy seems as reasonable as it does to him because it is set in a 
whole web of Christian beliefs not only about God's existence and attribut-
es but also about the nature of human beings in this world, the existence 
and nature of the afterlife, and the means by which human beings are 
brought to happiness in it. 
Saadia's account of Job 
Saadia accepts the same basic account of the story of Job as Aquinas and 
most other readers of the story do. He agrees that Job is morally innocent, 
that he suffers horribly, and that his suffering is in no way deserved, con-
trary to the position of the ill-named Comforters. Like Aquinas, he also 
supposes that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good. 
Furthermore, by 'goodness' here he means goodness by some objective 
standard, and not just goodness constituted by whatever God wills. As one 
scholar commenting on Saadia's position puts it: 
"Princes too can be guilty of injustice, and it is not by right of owner-
ship that God is just, as was argued by the Ash'arites, whose slogan 
was, "There is no injustice to a chattle." On the contrary, Saadiah 
argues ... that one cannot ascribe to God actions which would be 
unjust by human standards. Saadiah rejects the theistic subjectivism 
of his Ash' arite contemporaries .... "19 
Given these views of Saadia's, it is obvious that from his point of view the 
story of Job, which stands as representative for all the suffering of unwill-
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ing innocents, requires some theodicy. 
Like Aquinas, Saadia has strenuous requirements for theodicy. He 
says, "God's creating suffering, sickness, and injury in the world is also an 
act of beneficence and in the interest of humanity .... What is true of suffer-
ings felt without affecting the body is true also of those that do affect it-
the Creator does not so afflict His servant except in his [the servant's] own 
interest and for his own good."2G So Saadia, like Aquinas, thinks that the 
benefits which justify God in permitting suffering must go primarily to the 
sufferer. 
There are three ways in which this can occur, on Saadia's view. 
First, there is the sort of suffering which constitutes training and charac-
ter-building. Saadia says, 
"Although these may be painful for human beings, hard, wearying, 
and troubling of mind, all this is for our own good. Of this the 
prophet says, the chastening of the Lord, my son, despise not .... we know 
from our own experience that one who is wise does burden himself 
with late hours and hard work, reading books, taxing his mental 
powers and discernment, to understand. But this is no injustice and 
not wrong in the least on his part."21 
Here the idea seems to be that just as it is not wrong for the scholar to 
afflict himself for the sake of excellence in scholarship, so it is not wrong 
for God to afflict a person for the sake of the excellence of that person's 
character. 
Second, there is "purgation and punishment". If the first case can be 
thought of as making a basically good person better, this second case can 
be thought of as keeping a person who has done something bad from get-
ting worse and rectifying his accounts so that he is not in moral debt any 
more. In explaining the nature of purgative punishments, Saadia says, 
"if a servant [of God's] does commit an offense deserving punish-
ment, part of the goodness of the All-Merciful ... is in His causing 
some form of suffering to clear the transgressor's guilt wholly or in 
part. In such a case that suffering is called purgative: although it is a 
punishment, its object is that of grace, for it deters the transgressor 
from repeating his offenses and purifies him of those already com-
mitted."n 
Those familiar with John Hick's theodicy might suppose that these two 
categories of Saadia's would be enough to construct a theodicy. The sec-
ond case could account for all those sufferers who aren't innocent, and the 
first case could then be made to accommodate the suffering of unwilling 
innocents such as Job. But, on Saadia's view, to explain such suffering as 
Job's we need yet a third category: 
"The third case is that of trial and testing. An upright servant, whose 
Lord knows that he will bear sufferings loosed upon him and hold 
steadfast in his uprightness, is subjected to certain sufferings, so that 
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when he steadfastly bears them, his Lord may reward and bless him. 
This too is a kind of bounty and beneficence, for it brings the servant 
to everlasting blessedness."23 
That is why, Saadia maintains, one kind of goodness that God shows his 
creatures is 
"recompense for tribulations with which He has afflicted us and 
which we have borne with fortitude .... For the tribulations are not on 
account of some past sin on the servant's part. They are spontaneous-
ly initiated by God. Their purpose, therefore, lies in the future .... The 
Allwise knows that when we are visited with sufferings they are 
abhorrent to our natures and harrowing to us in our struggle to sur-
mount them. So He records all to our account in His books. If we 
were to read these ledgers, we would find all we have suffered made 
good, and we would be confirmed in our acceptance of His decree."24 
According to Saadia, then, God permits suffering to come to an unwill-
ing innocent, but apparently just for the sake of rewarding him in the after-
life for his having endured such suffering. The sufferings of Job, in 
Saadia's view, fall into this third sort of case, and what Job calls into ques-
tion with his complaints is only God's recompense for the sufferings of the 
righteous. Supporting Elihu's side in the dispute among Job and his com-
forters, Saadia says, "Elihu denies ... Job's claim that God has caused him to 
suffer ... without affording him any recompense in the hereafter."25 
It is not entirely clear how Saadia's first and third cases differ from each 
other, since one might suppose that in the third case the righteous person's 
character was in fact strengthened by his enduring afflictions with forti-
tude and in the first case the sufferer whose character is being strengthened 
will ultimately reap some reward in the afterlife for having developed a 
better character through suffering. Saadia himself sometimes seems to con-
£late the first and third cases. So, for example, he says, 
"when sufferings and calamities befall us, ... they must be of one of 
two classes: either they occur on account of prior sins of ours, in 
which case they are to be called punishments .... Or they are a trial 
from the Allwise, which we must bear steadfastly, after which He 
will reward US."26 
When he does make some remarks aimed at distinguishing these two 
cases, he tends to say things of this sort: 
"Job held it admissible that the Allwise might cause suffering to His 
servant despite that servant's being guilty of no sin. By our account, 
such sufferings would be called chastisements - unless they were 
for the sake of future recompense, in which case they would be called 
trials." 27 
Here the idea seems to be that the first and third cases are distinguished by 
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the purpose for which God allows the suffering of the righteous. If it is 
largely for the sake of building character now, we have the first case; but if 
it is primarily for the sake of a reward later, in the afterlife, we have the 
third case. 
Sometimes it seems as if Saadia postulates the third case just because it 
is needed to cover the sorts of suffering of unwilling innocents which 
would be difficult to construe as character-building. So, for example, in 
describing the various species of suffering that are included in the third 
case, Saadia says, 
"there are three kinds of trial: by way of property, by way of body, 
and by way of soul. Two of these ... are called tests. But the third, by 
way of the soul, is not called a test, because when suffered to the full 
it results in death. Rather it is called immolation .... This too God may 
inflict upon the righteous without any prior offense but with subse-
quent recompense - as He did with the infants at the flood, the 
infants of the seven (Canaanite) nations, Job's children, and others."2s 
Punishing infants for sin seems morally absurd, and it is not much more 
plausible to suppose that infants who die in their sufferings are allowed to 
suffer for the sake of developing their character. So Saadia is right to sup-
pose that the suffering of infants would be hard to assimilate to either of 
his first two cases. That he needs some additional explanation of the suf-
fering of unwilling innocents is therefore clear. It is not nearly as clear, 
however, that his third case provides the needed explanation. 
Objections to Saadia's theory of sufferillg as trial 
Although Saadia's third case covers instances of innocent suffering 
which his position would otherwise be hard-pressed to account for, there is 
nonetheless something morally distressing about this case, as it is com-
monly understood. If one of the purposes of theodicy is to show that the 
evil in the world is compatible with the existence of a God who is good, it 
isn't at all clear that Saadia's theodicy succeeds in this regard. Maimonides, 
for example, rejects it with vehemence. He reads Saadia's interpretation of 
Job into the views of one of Job's comforters, Bildad the Shuhite. 29 
According to Maimonides, Bildad's line to Job comes to this: 
"If you are innocent and have not sinned, the reason for these great 
events [Job's sufferingsl is to make great your reward. You will 
receive the finest of compensations. All this is good for you, so that 
the good that you will obtain [will] in the end be increased."30 
Maimonides thinks that this view is common, vulgar, stupid, and impious. 
He says, 
"What is generally accepted among people regarding the subject of 
trial is this: God sends down calamities upon an individual without 
their having been preceded by a sin, in order that his reward be 
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increased. However, this principle is not at all mentioned in the 
Torah in an explicit text. ... The principle of the Law that runs counter 
to this opinion, is that contained in His dictum, may He be exalted: A 
God of faithfulness and without iniquity. Nor do all the Sages profess this 
opinion of the multitude, for they say sometimes: There is no death 
without sin and no sufferings without transgression. And this [the quot-
ed view of the Sages] is the opinion that ought to be believed by 
every adherent of the Law who is endowed with intellect, for he 
should not ascribe injustice to God, may He be exalted above this, so 
that he believes that Zayd is innocent of sin and is perfect and that he 
does not deserve what befell him."" 
It should perhaps be said that Maimonides's own account of suffering, if 
it is represented accurately in this passage, seems considerably less palat-
able than the view of Saadia's which he is attacking. It is not always easy 
to know what Maimonides's own opinions are, however, given the com-
mitment to caution and secrecy evinced in the Guide, and perhaps 
Maimonides here means to be presenting only religious views suitable for 
the unlearned. But there are certainly passages in which Maimonides 
appears to be arguing explicitly for the view that every sufferer deserves 
exactly what he suffers. So, for example, he says, 
"It is likewise one of the fundamental principles of the Law of Moses 
our Master that [1] it is in no way possible that He, may He be exalted, 
should be unjust, and that [2] all the calamities that befall men and 
the good things that come to men, be it a single individual or a 
group, are all of them determined according to the deserts of the men 
concerned through equitable judgment in which there is no injustice 
whatever. Thus if some individual were wounded in the hand by a 
thorn, which he would take out immediately, this would be a punish-
ment for him, and if he received the slightest pleasure, this would be 
a reward for him - all this being according to his deserts. Thus He, 
may He be exalted, says: For all His ways are judgment.. .. "12 
And as a palliative for what seems to be the manifest mistakenness of his 
position, Maimonides adds that human judgments of the moral state of 
others is often wrong: "But we are ignorant of the various modes of 
deserts."" 
Even those commentators who think Maimonides's own account of suf-
fering needs some detailed, explanatory apologetic are inclined to accept 
his evaluation of 5aadia's position. So, for example, Oliver Leaman says, 
"It is not just that Saaya represents God as rather like a judge, a very 
human judge, but also that as a judge he seems to be particularly 
unpleasant. He makes it all right in the end, but seems to torment 
people for no other reason than to test them, or for no reason at all, 
with the ultimate promise that compensation will be available .... Is 
this how we should view the deity?"'4 
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What gives rise to the sort of complaint made by both Maimonides and 
Leaman is an important difference between Aquinas's theodicy and 
Saadia's, if Leaman and Maimonides understand Saadia correctly here. 
Aquinas and Saadia clearly share certain theological as well as ethical 
views. Both of them assume, for example, that God knows and cares about 
individual human beings, unlike the fourteenth-century Jewish philoso-
pher Gersonides, for example, who seems to think that God's providence 
doesn't extend to all individual human beings.'s Unlike the Ash'arites 
Saadia opposed, who apparently thought that God's will constitutes 
morality, both Aquinas and Saadia also assume that God's goodness isn't 
simply constituted by his will; it isn't the case, in their view, that whatever 
God wills is good just because he wills it. Finally, both of them suppose 
that God is justified in allowing some unwilling innocent to suffer only in 
case the benefit that justifies the suffering goes primarily to the sufferer. In 
trying to explain how it is that God is justified in allowing Job to suffer, 
both of them look only for benefits that accrue solely or primarily to Job; 
neither of them entertains the possibility that God might be just in allowing 
Job to suffer because of benefits which come to, say, Elihu or others who 
might learn from what happens to Job. 
But as Saadia is understood by Maimonides and contemporary scholars 
such as Leaman, Saadia and Aquinas differ on one important issue. On 
Aquinas's view, suffering is medicinal for the cancer of the will innate in 
all post-Fall human beings. Unless that cancer is cured, human beings can-
not be united to God in the afterlife, and not being ultimately united to 
God is the worst evil that can befall a human being. Undeserved suffering, 
then, is allowed by God in order to help ward off a greater evil. On 
Saadia's view, however, the situation is different, at least on the interpreta-
tion being considered here. For Saadia, undeserved suffering is allowed by 
God for the sake of a greater good for the sufferer - the compensation 
God will give to the innocent sufferer in the afterlife - and not to ward off 
a greater evil. 
If Maimonides and Leaman are right about the nature of Saadia's posi-
tion, then, there are two problems with Saadia's theodicy. 
First, it isn't clear that, on Saadia's view, the benefit and the suffering are 
connected in the right sort of way. Aquinas supposes that suffering can 
have an effect on the will and that without the sort of change in the will 
which suffering is designed to help bring about, a human being will not be 
in the right state to be united to God in heaven. Furthermore, even an 
omnipotent God cannot produce such a change in the will directly, by an 
exercise of his power, because human wills are free. So suffering may be 
the best available means in the circumstances, even for omnipotent God, to 
keep human beings from the state in which they can't be united to him in 
the afterlife. But there doesn't seem to be any such essential connection 
between suffering and the benefit it yields on Saadia's view. If God com-
pensates a person for undeserved suffering by giving that person some gift 
in the afterlife, why couldn't God simply choose to give that person such a 
gift even without the suffering? And if God could give the benefit without 
the suffering, is it morally right of him to allow the suffering just for the 
sake of the benefit? If nothing about the sufferer's circumstances or choices 
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means that the benefit can't come to him without the suffering, isn't the 
suffering entirely gratuitous? And is God good if he allows entirely gratu-
itious suffering? 
Secondly, even if there were the requisite sort of connection between the 
suffering and the benefit, it isn't clear that it is, in general, morally right to 
bring it about (or allow it to occur when one could readily prevent it) that 
an innocent person suffers unwillingly for the sake of some greater good 
for that person. It is, of course, not always easy to make a distinction 
between acting to produce a greater good and acting to ward off a greater 
eviI.J6 But we do often make a rough and intuitive distinction of this sort, 
and we are generally much more willing to conscience suffering induced 
or allowed to ward off a greater evil than suffering induced or allowed just 
for the sake of a greater good. 
Consider, for example, this case. For the sake of argument, suppose that 
a person who is deprived of all sensory stimulation for a long period in 
childhood and subjected to severe bodily hardships will in after years 
always react with great pleasure to things other people take for granted -
sunlight, fresh air, even minimal food, the presence of other human beings, 
and so on. And suppose also that on some reasonably plausible scale of 
hedonistic value, the pleasure produced as a result of a period of such 
hardship and deprivation is enormously greater than the pain associated 
with it. Even if we granted these assumptions, we certainly would not 
suppose that the desire to produce such subsequent pleasure for a child 
rendered good a person who kept a three-year old isolated and half-
starved in a dark and airless closet for a year or two. And our negative 
evaluation of the child's tormenter wouldn't be lessened by discovering 
that she had some special rights with regard to the child, that her relation-
ship to the child gave her a special responsibility for his well-being. A 
mother who did such things would surely lose her child to social services 
(or so one would hope). 
On the other hand, a mother who subjected her child to such misery for 
the sake of warding off from the child some greater evil wouldn't meet 
with similar moral disapproval. If it turned out that sensory deprivation 
and restricted food intake for a period of a year or two kept the child from 
a lingering and painful death, we would approve of such treatment for the 
child. In fact, a mother who couldn't bring herself to consent to such treat-
ment of her child, who preferred her child's slow and wretched death, 
would strike us as culpably weak, or worse. 
So we do make a rough distinction between acquiring a greater good 
and warding off a greater evil, and it makes a difference to our moral eval-
uation whether an agent who could prevent suffering of an unwilling 
innocent allows it to occur for the sake of a greater good for the sufferer or 
to ward off a greater harm. We are not in general inclined to suppose that 
it is morally acceptable to allow suffering just for the sake of a greater good 
for the sufferer. When it is also the case that the greater good can be 
obtained without the suffering, as it apparently can in Saadia's case, then 
we are even less likely to suppose that the benefit justifies the suffering. 
So the difference between Aquinas's account of suffering and Saadia's 
only highlights the inadequacies of Saadia's theodicy. 
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Saadia's theodicy reconsidered 
This negative evaluation of Saadia is based, of course, on the assump-
tion that interpreters such as Maimonides and Leaman have understood 
Saadia's position correctly.37 And here, I think, there is room for dispute. 
To see why this is so, it is important to set Saadia's theodicy within the 
context of his broader philosophical and theological views. 
To begin with, he supposes that a human being consists of a body and a 
soul and that these can be separated. At death, the body rots, but the soul 
persists. After a certain time, the soul and the body are reunited, and the 
resurrected individual lives forever. Not only does Saadia hold this belief, 
but, in his view, so does every Jew. He says, 
"as far as the resurrection of the dead is concerned ... it is a matter 
upon which our nation is in complete agreement. The basis of this 
conclusion is a premise mentioned previously in the first treatises of 
this book: namely, that man is the goal of all creation. The reason 
why he has been distinguished above all other creatures is that he 
might serve God, and the reward for this service is life eternal in the 
world of recompense. Prior to this event, whenever He sees fit to do 
so, God separates man's spirit from his body until the time when the 
number of souls meant to be created has been fulfilled, whereupon 
God brings about the union of all bodies and souls again .... We ... do 
not know of any Jew who would disagree with this belief.1f3s 
Additionally, in the afterlife, human beings will be divided into two 
groups, those receiving reward and those receiving punishment. Rewards 
and punishments will be meted out to resurrected individuals, and they 
will be perpetual. Nonetheless, these perpetual punishments or rewards 
will not all be maximal or infinite in quality. Rather, they will be graded 
and proportional to a person's good or bad deeds: 
"even though the reward and the punishment... will be everlasting, 
their extent will vary according to the act. Thus, for example, the 
nature of a person's reward will be dependent upon whether he pre-
sents one or ten or one hundred or one thousand good deeds, except 
that it will be eternal in duration ..... Likewise will the extent of a per-
son's punishment vary according to whether he presents one or ten 
or a hundred or a thousand evil deeds, except that, whatever the 
intensity of the punishment may be, it will be everlasting."39 
Furthermore, there is no change from one state to another in the after-
life; an individual remains forever in whatever state he was in when he 
entered the afterlife.40 
Saadia recognizes, of course, that some people will wonder whether a 
good God shouldn't simply have created people perfectly, unalterably 
good from the beginning, so that they would go directly from creation into 
the state of happiness in the afterlife. Since some people will end up in that 
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condition, unable to do evil any more, why not just create them in that 
state in the first place and thus avoid all the suffering in this life and the 
next? 
Saadia's response is twofold. First, he gives a familiar answer to the 
question, namely, that God can't do so because doing so would require 
determining human wills, and human wills can't be determined if (as 
Saadia supposes) they are free. Furthermore, he thinks that free will is of 
great value, so that it doesn't occur to him to suppose human beings would 
be better off if God took away freedom in the interests of removing suffer-
ing; on the contrary, he explicitly values suffering as an aid to the rectitude 
of free willY Secondly, he argues that God's not creating human beings in 
the state of bliss and sinlessness the righteous will have in the afterlife is for 
the good of human beings for another reason: 
"according to the judgment of reason the person who achieves some 
good by means of the effort that he has expended for its attainment 
obtains double the advantage gained by him who achieves this good 
without any effort but merely as a result of the kindness shown him 
by God."42 
The afterlife bestowed as a result of human choices and human effort will 
be more precious, Saadia thinks, than it would be if (per impossibile) people 
were simply born into it as a result of God's decree. 
Next, although he thinks that the afterlife admits of gradations of 
reward and punishment, Saadia recognizes only two groups in the after-
life, those who are unendingly rewarded and those who are unendingly 
punished. He has a less stern notion of the requirements for being in the 
group of the righteous, however. The completely righteous person is some-
one who has always fulfilled all the commandments. About this sort of 
person, Saadia says, 
"even though in the opinion of men the probability of the existence of 
such a person who is blameless in every respect appears to be 
extremely remote, I yet consider it possible. For were it not so, the 
All-Wise would not have prescribed such a goal."4} 
Saadia, in other words, feels he has to argue for the possibility of there being 
a completely righteous person, on the theoretical grounds that God's com-
mandments would otherwise be futile; but he seems to join what he pre-
sents as the general consensus in supposing that the chances of there actual-
ly being such a person is "extremely remote." The group of the righteous in 
the afterlife is therefore not populated, largely or entirely, by people from 
this category. 
Instead, the righteous in the afterlife will consist of sinners who have 
repented their sins. By repentance, Saadia explains he means f/(a) the 
renunciation of sin, (b) remorse, (c) the quest of forgiveness, and (d) the 
assumption of the obligation not to relapse into sin."44 In Saadia's view, 
most Jews fall into this category, or are very close to it: 
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"Now I have no fears, so far as the majority of our people are con-
cerned, in regard to their being remiss in their fulfillment of any of 
the conditions of repentance except this fourth category - I mean 
that of lapsing back into sin. For I believe that at the time when they 
fast and pray, they sincerely mean to abandon their sinful way and 
experience remorse and seek God's pardon."4s 
On Saadia's view, however, real repentance is not canceled by subse-
quent sin: 
"if the resolve on the part of a servant of God not to lapse into sin 
again is sincere, his repentance is accepted, so that if, as a result of 
temptation, he falls once more, his repentance is not thereby forfeited. 
What happens is rather that the iniquities he committed before his 
repentance are canceled, only those committed by him thereafter 
being charged against him. The same would apply even if this were 
to occur several times; namely, that he repent and lapse back into sin. 
Only the wrongs perpetrated by him after his repentance would 
count against him, that is, provided he has been sincere each time in 
his resolve not to relapse."46 
So the group of the righteous who are unendingly rewarded in the after-
life will consist largely of ordinary people who have repented their sins. 
What happens, however, if someone has repented most of his sins but 
not all, perhaps because he has forgotten some or perhaps because some of 
them are so rooted in his character that repentance for them isn't psycho-
logically possible for him? Saadia supposes that no one can be a member 
of both the rewarded and the punished in the afterlife. Will the person 
who hasn't repented all his sins forgo his reward in the afterlife? 
Saadia's answer to this question is that individuals of this sort receive 
punishment for such sins in this life precisely so that those unrepented sins 
don't imperil their otherworldly reward. By the same token, unrepentant 
sinners who do some good receive the reward of their good acts in this life, 
so that their otherworldly punishment doesn't keep them from reaping 
whatever little reward is due them for their few good actsY 
Saadia's position here will seem to some philosophers to raise serious 
questions about his conception of God's justice, since one might wonder 
whether it is fair of God to assign perpetual reward or punishment for tem-
porally limited actions. But I bring up this feature of Saadia's position here 
only to point out how much more complicated his views about suffering 
are than they initially appeared to be. When one of the righteous suffers in 
this world in order that his few unrepented sins might not imperil his sal-
vation, in which category of suffering does his pain fall? 
On the face of it, his pain falls into the second of Saadia's three cate-
gories, suffering as punishment for sin. But, on the other hand, the point of 
the suffering is not so much backward-looking - as we might have 
expected in the case of suffering in Saadia's second category - as forward-
looking: the point of the suffering is that God can then with justice give the 
unrepentant sinner eternal reward. And so this sort of suffering shares 
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some features of the third category of suffering, namely, that the point of 
God's allowing the suffering is the sufferer's reward in the afterlife. On the 
other hand, in explaining why it is appropriate for God to punish in this 
life people who are generally righteous, Saadia gives an explanation which 
makes it look as if the suffering belongs in the first category, the category 
of sufferings allowed in order to build the character of the sufferer. So, for 
example, he says, 
"Should someone ask, however, on what ground they [the righteous 
person's unrepented evils] are pardoned, seeing that no repentance 
of them has taken place, we would answer: ... when a person follows 
such a [generally righteous] course and most of his actions are good, 
retribution for these relatively minor misdeeds is exacted from him in 
this world, so that he departs from it cleared of all blemish ... " 48 
So even the relatively simple second category of suffering, punishment 
for sin, is in fact much more complicated in Saadia's developed philosophi-
cal theology than at first appears. Part of the reason for the confusion is, no 
doubt, that we tend to think of punishment simply as retributive, but, for 
Saadia, punishment at least in this life is medicinal and therefore, like all 
successful medicine, carries with it both improvement and the rewards 
that improvement brings with it. That is why his second category of suf-
fering contains some elements of the other categories as well, namely, the 
betterment of the simler and the consequent reward of the morally healthy 
righteous. 
In explaining his third category of suffering, the trial of a righteous per-
son, Saadia makes a point which at first glance looks only lamentably 
ridiculous. He says, 
"the sufferings to which the virtuous are subjected in this world fall 
into two categories. One of these constitutes the penalties for slight 
[unrepented] failings, as I have explained previously. The second 
consists of incipient trials with which God tests them, when He 
knows that they are able to endure them, only in order to compensate 
them for these trials later on with good."49 
There is something apparently absurd and unjust about God's testing an 
individual only when he is sure of the outcome of the test and only for the 
sake of compensating the wretched and innocent victim of the test after-
wards. Maimonides's diatribe against this view seems entirely warranted. 
But if we look more closely, Saadia's third category of suffering, like his 
second category, becomes more complicated and more interesting. 
The group of the righteous, according to Saadia, consists largely in those 
who are repentant for their sins. But sins leave a stain on the soul, on his 
views.50 So, he says, 
"obedience [to God's commandments] increases the luminosity of the 
soul's substance, whereas sin renders its substance turbid and 
black."S! 
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I'm not sure to what extent Saadia means this point literally or 
metaphorically, but his general idea is not hard to grasp. Any instance of 
moral wrongdoing carries with it two problems for the wrongdoer, one as 
regards the future and one as regards the past. Doing a wrong act has 
some influence on character; it increases the likelihood that one will do 
such a wrong act again in the future. The solution for this future-oriented 
problem lies in repentance, which to some extent unravels the twist in the 
character produced by doing the wrong act. But there remains a problem 
for the wrongdoer as regards the past: he is still a person who has done 
such a wrong act. If Goebbels, for example, truly repented and entirely 
regretted the evil he did, there would still be a problem because of what 
occurred in the past. What he has already done has turned him into some-
thing from which other people want to shy away; and this remains the case 
even if people were to know that Goebbels regretted his past evils. 
Because of the evil he has perpetrated, Goebbels, even in a repentant state, 
is turbid, as Saadia says - stained or polluted, in Saadia's idiom; in our 
health-oriented idiom, psychologically sick. 
Someone might suppose that repentance itself is enough to remove 
what Saadia thinks of as the stain on the soul, but this seems to me a mis-
taken view. Consider the effects of wrongdoing on the body, rather than 
the mind. Consider, for example, someone who for many years has 
indulged in excessive eating and has also avoided exercise. On the day on 
which such a person truly repents of that behavior and enters on a new life 
of exercise and right eating, his repentance by itself won't be enough to 
give him a healthy and athletic body. The effects of his previous acts will 
obviously remain, and it will take a long time of dieting and exercising 
before those effects are no longer evident. Why suppose things are any bet-
ter as regards the mind? Why suppose that all the bad mental effects of 
previous wrongdoing can be wiped away in a moment with an act of 
repentance? It seems clear, for example, that even earnest and sincere 
repentance can co-exist with many of the old attitudes and habits laid 
down by previous wrongdoing. An act of repentance by itself won't be 
enough to undo those old dispositions or to make a person internally inte-
grated and unified around the good newly willed. Repentance is thus psy-
chologically compatible with many of the dispositions laid down by the 
previous wrongdoing. 52 A repentant agent in such a condition will, of 
course, be internally divided or even irrational, but these are not uncom-
mon human conditions. Whole-heartedness and rationality may be as hard 
to come by, for a newly repentant person, as a healty and athletic body is 
for a person with a newly reformed lifestyle. 53 I do not want to claim that 
dispositions and attitudes left by wrongdoing exhaust all that Saadia has in 
mind with his notion of the stain on the soul, but they are enough, I think, 
to show that the backwards-looking problem of moral wrongdoing isn't 
likely to be solved by repentance alone. 
The solution to this backwards-looking problem of moral wrongdoing, 
in Saadia's view, is suffering on the part of the wrongdoer. 
This way of thinking about Saadia's third category of suffering also 
helps explain his distinction between this category and the first one, where 
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the suffering is for the sake of character-building. Saadia thinks of the 
righteous as comprised mainly of those who are struggling with their own 
moral wrong-doing: sinning, repenting, and then sinning again. Building 
character, as suffering in the first category is said to do, will be a matter of 
strengthening a person in this struggle, so that the suffering brings him to 
repentance or confirms him in his repentant resolve not to sin again in that 
way. Suffering that builds character thus helps to overcome the future-ori-
ented problem of a person's wrong-doing. But the backwards-looking 
problem remains. When suffering helps solve this problem, the suffering 
serves not so much to build character for the future as to purge the pollut-
ed state of soul the sinner has already acquired. 
Using suffering as an antidote to pollution takes God's omniscient prov-
idence, since only God can see the heart and can understand what pollu-
tion is there and how suffering can cure it. So Saadia says, 
"Now He that subjects the soul to its trials is none other than the 
Master of the universe, who is, of course, acquainted with all its 
doings. This testing of the soul has been compared to the assaying by 
means of fire of [lumps of metal] that have been referred to as gold or 
silver. It is thereby that the true nature of their composition is clearly 
established. For the original gold and silver remain, while the alloys 
that have been mingled with them are partly burned and partly take 
flight ... .The pure, clear souls that have been refined are thereupon 
exalted and ennobled."'· 
That is why God allows suffering as test only for those people he knows 
can endure it. If those tested lacked strength for the test, then in the 
process of testing they would succumb to further sin, and the test would 
make them worse, rather than purging the stains from the soul. Like 
Aquinas, then, Saadia thinks that those like Job who experience perplexing, 
agonizing suffering which they do not deserve do so just because they are 
better servants of God and more able to sustain the rigors of therapy than 
God's weaker, smaller servants. 
For the same reason, Saadia says, 
"if the pain to which the servant of God is subjected constitutes pun-
ishment and he asks his Master to enlighten him thereon [and explain 
to him why he is suffering], it is a rule with Him to do so .... On the 
other hand, if the pain to which the servant of God is subjected serves 
as a form of trial and he asks his Master to inform him why He has 
brought this trial upon him, it is a rule with Him not to inform him ..... 
when Job asked: Make me know wherefore Thou contendest with me ... , no 
explanation was offered to him."5" 
If it was clear to the sufferer that the suffering was for cleansing of the soul 
and its subsequent rewards, then, in Saadia's view, the suffering would 
lose some of its therapeutic value, since then one might endure the suffer-
ing simply for the sake of the reward. 
So, examined more closely, Saadia's third category of suffering looks 
540 Faith and Philosophy 
very different from the way it is presented by some of its interpreters. In 
the first place, the righteous who are suffering are, in general, not those 
who are entirely without moral wrongdoing, but rather are those who 
have repented their wrongdoings, or most of them. Furthermore, the suf-
fering isn't gratuitous or only accidentally related to the benefit. On 
Saadia's view, the suffering is in some way instrumental in bringing about 
the benefit. The stain on the soul brought about by wrongdoing is 
removed by suffering, and nothing in Saadia's account suggests he sup-
poses that the stain could be removed just as well in some other way, for 
example, by omnipotent God's acting directly to remove it. 
Finally, the feature that initially seemed to render Saadia's theodicy 
philosophically more problematic than Aquinas's is now called into ques-
tion. It is no longer so clear that, for Saadia, the benefit which justifies God 
in allowing the suffering of unwilling innocents is a greater good for the 
sufferer, as distinct from the warding off of a greater evil. On Saadia's 
account, the perpetual rewards in the afterlife are distributed in accordance 
with an individual's state of soul. A righteous individual who enters the 
afterlife with certain stains on the soul will forever lose part of the reward 
he might have had if he had purged those stains. For all time to come, he 
will be less or have less than he might otherwise have been or had. 
Perhaps, because the afterlife is supposed to be a state of bliss, the right-
eous person in this diminished state won't mind it, as the souls in Dante's 
Paradiso explain to him that they don't mind not being in the top rank of 
those in heaven. A loss can be a loss, however, even if one doesn't mind it. 
The cancer patient not accepted for bone marrow transplant, which holds 
out the only hope of a cure, might well not mind, considering the difficulty 
of the therapy and the suffering it occasions. But he would have lost some-
thing anyway. All the more so, then, if what is at issue is not some tempo-
rary state of physical health but a permanent state of spiritual wellbeing. 
On this way of interpreting Saadia's account, then, the benefit which justi-
fies the suffering in the third category, of tests and trials, is not the acquisi-
tion of a greater good for the sufferer but the warding off of a greater evil. 
One might suppose that there is one group of human beings whose suf-
ferings Saadia assigns to the third category but for whom my revised inter-
pretation of this category is bound to fail. This is the group of those chil-
dren who die in their suffering. Saadia says, for example, 
"we are confronted by the fact that God, the just, ordered the killing 
of the young children of the Midianites and the extermination of the 
young children of the generation of the deluge. We note also how He 
continually causes pain and even death to little babes. Logical neces-
sity, therefore, demands that there exist after death a state in which 
they would obtain compensation for the pain suffered .... "56 
Here, one would suppose, Saadia must adopt the line attributed to him by 
Maimonides. 
But, in fact, when Saadia elaborates on the suffering of children, he 
makes remarks of this sort: 
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"I will go still further and say that it is even possible for a completely 
guiltless individual to be subjected to trials in order to be compensat-
ed for them afterwards, for I find that children are made to suffer 
pain, and I have no doubt about their eventual compensation for 
these sufferings. The sorrows brought upon them by the All-Wise 
might, therefore, be compared to the discipline that their faher might 
administer to them in the form of flogging or detention in order to 
keep them from harm, or to the repulsive, bitter medicines that he 
might make them drink in order to put an end to their illness."s7 
Here the two examples given to illustrate God's purpose in allowing the 
suffering of children are both examples in which a father causes suffering 
to his children in order to ward off greater evil - "harm", in the first 
example, and continuing illness, in the second. It is far from clear that 
Saadia's position here is consistent. The children in the example are appar-
ently already in trouble, since medicine is administered to those who are 
sick and "flogging" to those who are being punished for some wrong, and 
yet the point of these examples is to provide some explanation of the way 
in which God deals with children whom Saadia himself takes to be perfect-
ly innocent. But what is important for my purposes here is just the fact 
that when Saadia considers the suffering of children in any detail, he sup-
poses that allowing their suffering is justified in virtue of the fact that their 
suffering prevents a greater harm to them. 
Looked at in this way, then, Saadia's theodicy appears very different 
from the way it has been taken by some of its interpreters. In fact, 
although Saadia and Aquinas are separated by a great gulf of religion, 
time, and culture, and although Saadia certainly repudiates Christianity 
with vehemence approaching scorn,'s Saadia's account of the suffering of 
unwilling innocents looks very close to that of Aquinas, for all their other 
differences in theological doctrine.59 
Saadia's Judaism and Leaman's Objection 
I suggested near the outset that approaching Saadia's theodicy with that 
of Aquinas in mind would help us see what is paradigmatically Jewish 
about Saadia's, but my revised interpretation seems to imply that there is 
nothing of that sort to see. This is a mistaken impression, however. The 
main difference between Aquinas and Saadia comes not so much in the 
way they justify God's allowing suffering as in the nature of the suffering 
they consider. Aquinas thinks largely or exclusively of the sufferings of 
individuals. Saadia is concerned as well with a higher level of organiza-
tion; he focuses also on communal suffering, the afflictions and tribulations 
of a whole people. 
Everyone knows, Saadia says, that when there is some disaster that 
overtakes a whole people, the suffering of that disaster can plausibly be 
construed as punishment only for some of those involved; for the others, it 
is a trial, that is, suffering in the third category: 
"This is, as it is well known, a rule that applies to every universal cat-
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astrophe occurring at different times, such as famine, war, and pesti-
lence. These serve as punishment for some and as a trial for others.//ho 
This is true also of the sufferings of the Jews, according to Saadia: 
"God is just, doing no injustice, and He has already subjected this 
nation to a great and long-protracted trial, which undoubtedly serves 
partly as punishment and partly as a test for us .... [such operations] 
cannot proceed endlessly. Once, then, the end has been reached, 
there must needs be a cessation of the [this-worldly] punishment of 
those punishable and compensation for those subjected to trial.// 
In fact, on Saadia's view, the Jews have had a larger share of suffering 
than other peoples. Just as Job, who was one of God's better, stronger ser-
vants and so better able to endure the rigors of the spiritual therapy of suf-
fering, experienced much more suffering than most ordinary individuals, 
so the Jews have had more to bear in the way of trials than other peoples. 
For this reason, the resurrection of the dead will begin with the Jews, at the 
time of the Messianic redemption, and only subsequently will other peo-
ples be resurrected as well. Saadia says, 
"Now let me ask this general question: "Do not we, the congregation of 
monotheists, acknowledge that the Creator, magnified be His Majesty, 
will resurrect all the dead in the world to come for the occasion of their 
retribution?// But what is there in this that would contradict the view 
that this nation [the Jews] would enjoy an advantage in being granted 
an additional period during which our dead would be resurrected by 
God prior to the world to come, that new life of theirs being extended 
by Him up to the time of the life of the world to come? ... why should it 
not be considered as a mere act of justice whereby whoever has been 
tried receives compensation in proportion to his trials, since this nation 
of ours has been subjected by God to great trials, as Scripture says: For 
Thou, 0 God, hast tried us; Thou hast refined us? ... It is most fitting, there-
fore, that He should grant to it this additional period prior to the world 
to come so that it might have an advantage over all those [others] who 
have conducted themselves well in this world, just as its patience and 
its trials have exceeded those of the others.//61 
And in another place he says, 
"God has made us great and liberal promises of the well-being and 
bliss and greatness and might and glory that He will grant us 
twofold ... for the humiliation and misery that have been our lot. ... 
what has befallen us has been likened by Scripture to a brief twinkling 
of the eye, whereas the compensation God will give us in return there-
for has been referred to as His great mercy. For it says: For a small 
moment have I forsaken thee; but with great compassion will I gather thee.//62 
If Saadia's views on the suffering of children leave him open to moral 
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vituperation, his views of the communal suffering of his people and its 
reward render him vulnerable to ridicule, and he knows it. He says, in his 
own defense, 
"[you will find the Jews] patiently awaiting what God has promised 
us, not entertaining any doubts concerning it, nor worrying or despair-
ing. On the contrary, our courage and tenacity increase constantly, as 
is expressed in Scripture: Be strong, and let your heart take courage, all ye 
that wait for the Lord .... Now whoever sees us behaving in this fashion 
may be surprised at us or regard us as fools for the simple reason that 
he has not experienced what we have nor believed as we have 
believed. He resembles a person who has never seen how wheat is 
sown, wherefore, when he sees someone throw it into the cracks of the 
earth in order to let it grow, he thinks that that individual is a fool. It is 
at the time of the threshing, when every measure yields twenty or thir-
ty measures, that he first realizes that it is he who has been the fool."63 
It is instructive to compare Saadia's position here with that of someone 
taking what Saadia considers the real fool's position. So, for example, 
Leaman says, 
"It is a shame that the innocent suffer ... , but it is a fact in the sort of 
world which we inhabit. The Book of Job represents the terrible 
things which happen to people as brute facts, things which just hap-
pen and which we can often do nothing to prevent. Saadya cannot 
accept this at face value ... he thinks of the events of the world falling 
under an objective standard of justice which must regulate the bal-
ance between innocent pains and pleasures. If the innocent do suffer, 
then they must eventually be compensated for their suffering. If they 
are not thus compensated, then the situation is unjust. Of course, he 
has great difficulty fitting such a theory of justice onto the Book of 
Job, since it is precisely the message of the Book that that theory of 
justice is vacuous. There is no evidence of such justice in this world, 
and little reason to hope for it in another life."64 
According to Leaman, our evidence and our reason are against Saadia's 
position, that the world is ruled by a just God. Leaman begins with a fact 
that Saadia also grants, namely, that in this world the innocent suffer. For 
Leaman, to accept this fact at face value is to reject the claim that the suffer-
ing of the innocent is somehow justified or rectified. So Leaman begins 
with the fact of innocent suffering in the world, adds the belief that there is 
no morally sufficient reason which justifies such suffering, and concludes 
that the world is not ruled justly or by a just God. 
By contrast, Saadia's position constitutes what William Rowe has 
labeled a 'G.E.Moore shift' on the sort of argument represented by this 
quotation from Leaman. Saadia turns Leaman's sort of argument on its 
head; he begins with a firm belief that the world is ruled justly by a just 
God and concludes that there must be a morally sufficient reason for God 
to allow innocent suffering. His theodicy is an attempt to figure out, by 
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reason, revelation, and religious tradition, what sort of benefit might plau-
sibly constitute such a morally sufficient reason. 
This is no doubt why, contrary to expectations, his theodicy and 
Aquinas's are so much alike in their general outlines, despite the vast differ-
ences in philosophy and theology which separate the Jewish from the 
Christian thinker. They each begin with a commitment to belief in a God 
who is omniscient and omnipotent, who is the creator of the world, who 
knows and cares about all his creatures, and who is good by objective stan-
dards, where by 'good' we mean at least roughly what we mean when we 
call any person 'good'. Since neither Aquinas nor Saadia is willing to sus-
tain belief in such a God by denying (as Mairnonides in some passages 
appears to do) the plain fact of innocent suffering in the world, they con-
clude that there must be a morally sufficient reason for God to allow such 
suffering. There are also common moral intuitions, widely shared even 
across cultures and times, about what would justify any person in allowing 
innocent suffering when he could readily prevent it: the suffering must be 
necessary, or the best means available in the circumstances, for producing a 
benefit that goes primarily or largely to the sufferer; and, generally, the ben-
efit must be a matter of warding off a greater evil, rather than producing a 
greater good. Because, however much Judaism and Christianity differ oth-
erwise, Saadia and Aquinas share these moral intuitions and the relevant 
traditional theistic beliefs, their theodicies take shape in the same way."' 
On Leaman's view, of course, both Saadia and Aquinas are grossly mis-
taken, refusing to take facts "at face value" because of their religious com-
mitment. But why should Leaman suppose that his version of the argu·-
ment from evil is superior to or more rational than theirs? How does 
Leaman know that there is no morally sufficient reason for innocent suffer--
ing? Given the complexity of the ways in which Saadia thinks suffering can 
lead to a benefit for the sufferer, one couldn't just look at the world and 
and see that no such benefit obtained. 
Questions of this sort and the epistemological issues surrounding them 
have been the subject of sophisticated philosophical scrutiny in recent 
years, and it is no part of my aim here to survey that discussion or add to 
it.66 I bring it up just in order to point out one feature of Saadia's approach 
which seems to me significant for the discussion. How would someone 
come to know or be justified in believing the claim with which Saadia 
starts, namely, that there is a just God with the standard divine attributes 
who governs the earth? Answers that have been given include reason, as 
when a person takes himself to have a proof for God's existence, and reli-
gious experience, as when someone supposes that her experiences have 
given her the religious analogue of perception of God. Saadia, too, points 
to reason and religious experience. The person who mocks as stupid and 
foolish Jewish expectations of everlasting glory garnered through genera-
tions of purgative, refining suffering takes this foolish attitude, in Saadia's 
view, because he differs from Jews in reason and experience. 
But it is worth noticing that the reason and experience Saadia points to 
are communal, not individual. It is the failure of his opponent to experi-
ence what "we" have experienced or to believe what "we" have believed 
that makes "the fool" run the argument from evil in the way he does. The 
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experiences Saadia discusses in this connection are not his own religious 
experiences but the community's experience of God's parting the sea for 
the Jews in the exodus from Egypt; and the reasoned beliefs on which 
Saadia relies, here and throughout his whole treatise, are those which, as 
he says in one phrase or another, "our nation is in complete agreement 
[about]."67 So Saadia supposes that epistemological excellence or virtue 
can be vested in a community, as well as in an individual. Justification for 
a belief can come, at least in part, from the experiences and epistemic com-
mitments of a whole people. In weighing reasons and evidence for one 
belief or another, on Saadia's view, it is permissible or even imperative to 
avail oneself of that communal experience and expertise. This is an atti-
tude with which we are familiar from the practice of science/8 but it hasn't 
been the subject of much reflection in philosophy of religion. Saadia's con-
tinual consciousness of belonging to a people whose life over many gener-
ations has shaped a common set of religious commitments is, in my view, a 
salutary corrective to the individualism typically found in contemporary 
discussions of the problem of evil.69 
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